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What does science owe to literature? This has been a big question
for literary studies ever since the
mid-1980s, when Steven Shapin
and Simon Schaffer proposed that
seventeenth-century efforts to
establish the authority of the scientific method depended on the
“literary technology” of the experimental report as much as material
ones such as the air pump and the
microscope. In recent years, studies by John Bender, Al Coppola,
Courtney Weiss Smith, and Helen
Thompson, among others, have
sought to build on—and sometimes significantly modify—this
provocative thesis by exploring, on
the one hand, the literary forms and
devices that early scientists used
to advance new theories about the
natural world and, on the other, the
way poets, dramatists, and novelists responded to the new ideas and
methods of the Enlightenment’s
natural philosophers. Tita Chico’s
The Experimental Imagination:
Literary Knowledge and Science in
the British Enlightenment is a valuable addition to this project, which
synthesizes many of its key insights
while providing a concise, wideranging overview of the various
entanglements of literature and science in the period.
Chico begins by identifying
four of the key types of imaginative work involved in the production of scientific knowledge. In
the broader socio-cultural context, science functioned as what
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she calls a “trope”: long before it
had proven its social or economic
value, “experimental philosophy
connoted a sense of modernity”
(23). Purchasing a microscope or
attending a course of scientific lectures were forms of self-fashioning that allowed British men and
(increasingly) women to present
themselves as sophisticated, forward-thinking, and enlightened.
But the public was also required
to undertake imaginative labor at
the more fundamental, constitutive level of experimental practices
and protocols. The validity of an
experiment depended on textual
representations that turned readers into “virtual witnesses” able
to imagine the events described as
clearly as if they had seen them in
person. Although the Royal Society
insisted its publications be written
in a plain style and warned against
unnecessary rhetorical ornamentation, Robert Boyle and other
early members recognized that
vivid similes and metaphors were
crucial resources when it came to
explaining the unfamiliar, sometimes invisible, physical phenomena revealed by their experiments.
Likewise, one might think that the
collection of “observed particulars”
on which empirical theories about
nature were to be founded would
leave little room for the imagination, but Chico uses the example
of Robert Hooke’s microscopy to
show that deciding what natural
phenomena counted as significant
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or examining an object from multiple different angles to determine
its “true appearance” (33) involved
a process of selection and comparison not all that different from the
work of finding the right metaphor
or simile. Finally, Chico makes the
point that the credibility of the
experimentalist’s claims depended
on his rhetorical self-presentation
as a “modest witness” imbued
with an ethos of gentlemanly selfrestraint that served to erase his
subject position from the experimental scene and make him seem
as passive an instrument of knowledge production as the apparatus
he operated. But she also notes the
contradictory expectation that the
philosopher “transmit enthusiasm”
(40) for the experimental project
as a whole by adopting an affective register of wonder and delight
towards the divinely ordained
marvels to which he drew his readers’ attention.
Thereafter Chico looks at the
way a series of texts that we might
think of as more obviously “literary” responded to the new science’s epistemological retooling
of the imagination. In one especially engaging chapter, she locates
the origins of the popular subgenre inaugurated by Bernard de
Fontenelle’s Conversations on the
Plurality of Worlds (1686) in contemporary figurative constructions
of scientific practice as “an erotic,
seductive plot involving a masculinized experimentalist aspiring
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to dominate a feminized nature”
(77). Though a Frenchman and a
Cartesian, Fontenelle belongs in
a book about the British experimental imagination because of
the popularity of Aphra Behn’s
translation of the Conversations,
revised and reprinted throughout the eighteenth century, and
because of the countless imitations
it inspired that updated the science
while preserving the basic template
of a philosophical older man initiating a curious younger woman,
with varying degrees of erotic subtext, into the mysteries of modern
physics. Works such as Francesco
Algarotti’s Newtonianism for
the Ladies (1737), translated into
English by Elizabeth Carter, made
science sexy.
Elsewhere, however, Chico
shows how satirists latched on to
the imaginative aspects of the new
science to ridicule what they saw as
the immodesty of the experimental
philosophers’ pretensions to epistemological and cultural authority.
The “bad scientists” (74) that crop up
periodically in late seventeenth- and
early eighteenth-century comedy—
Sir Nicholas Gimcrack in Thomas
Shadwell’s The Virtuoso (1676), for
example, or Lady Science in James
Miller’s The Humours of Oxford
(1730)—adopt the rhetoric of disinterested curiosity and enlightened
benevolence, but soon reveal themselves to be ludicrously libidinous,
grasping, or self-serving, while
their enthusiasm for experimental
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philosophy is shown to be nothing
more than a shallow project of selfaggrandizement. As Chico shrewdly
observes, Susannah Centlivre puts
an intriguing spin on this formula in
The Basset Table (1705) by turning
the self-interest of the female virtuoso
Valeria into a form of feminist selfempowerment. By “transforming
her dressing room into a laboratory”
(60) and showing more interest in
her specimens than her lover, Chico
argues, Valeria is able “to imagine
her own self-determination” (59).
It is a compelling argument, even if
Chico misses a trick by neglecting
Valeria’s role as a foil for her cousin,
the flirtatious Lady Reveller, whose
taste for high-stakes gambling makes
Valeria’s scientific interests seem far
less subversive of the patriarchy by
comparison—
especially since the
final part of the chapter argues for
the figure of the reformed coquette
in Eliza Haywood’s The Female
Spectator (1748–9) as the basis for a
new form of “enlightened subjectivity” (64).
In a later chapter Chico turns to
the skeptical critiques of the utopian political ideology advanced
by the early experimentalists. If
the Royal Society’s first historian,
Thomas Sprat, sought to present
it as a model of civil government
with an exemplary commitment to “social improvement,”
“sober debate,” and “obedient”
yet “manly” (107) submission
to authority, Chico shows that
some of his contemporaries took
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a rather different view. Margaret
Cavendish, duchess of Newcastle,
drew on her doubly marginal
position as both a woman (she
was the first to attend a meeting
of the Royal Society, and the last
until the twentieth century) and
an ardent royalist and absolutist to
question the value of experimental philosophy as a means of securing either reliable knowledge
or peace and prosperity. In her
Observations upon Experimental
Philosophy (1666), as well as in
The Blazing World, the delightfully bizarre work of fiction she
appended to it, Cavendish challenged the imaginative leaps of
Hooke’s microscopy, claiming that
sensory perception was subjective and prone to errors and that
even the most reliable observed
particulars could not improve a
“stupid mind” (113). Encouraging
experimental philosophers to
share their ideas freely was in
her view, Chico notes, likely to
lead not to social progress but
to an “unstable, fractious body
politic” (117). Cavendish suggests her solution to this problem
when she has the Empress of the
Blazing World bring experimental science and technology under
the control of the absolutist state
in order to overawe her subjects
and enslave other nations, an
episode that Chico thinks makes
Cavendish’s view of experimental
philosophy seem “contradictory”
(117–18). But one could perhaps
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argue that the Empress’s exercise
of her absolute sovereign power
is understood to guarantee the
practical utility and authority of
knowledge that the free but disputatious experimentalists had
left speculative and uncertain.
Cavendish’s sense of the ease with
which experimental science might
be made to serve imperial interests is thus not so different from
Swift’s in Gulliver’s Travels (1726),
as Chico herself observes. Swift
broke off from writing Gulliver’s
Travels to pen a series of pamphlets attacking the British government’s ill-conceived attempt
to fix the Irish currency crisis by
replacing their silver halfpennies with copper ones that were
widely suspected of being debased
or even counterfeited. Newton’s
role in this project—as Warden
of the Royal Mint he authorized the assay of the new copper coins—helped convince Swift
that “natural philosophy served
the interests of capital accumulation and imperialist government”
(127) rather than the ordinary
people of Ireland. Chico argues
that this conviction informs
not only the satire of the Royal
Society’s experimental program
in Gulliver’s voyage to Laputa
but also, more interestingly, the
critique of the experimental principle that “reason is perception”
(132) suggested by his encounters
with the Houyhnhnms’ reductive
rationalism.
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Much of the conceptual weight
of Chico’s argument is carried by
her notion of “literary knowledge,”
a coinage that neatly encapsulates
the aspect of literary texts that literature and science scholarship is
best placed to highlight—namely,
their capacity to produce real, valuable knowledge about the world.
Chico is an eloquent advocate for
the epistemic value of literature,
especially when she is analyzing
the various forms of “literariness”
that natural philosophers made use
of to construct and explain their
ideas about the world. But she is
a little less sure-footed when discussing the kind of knowledge
that literariness produces when it is
criticizing or satirizing the natural
sciences. What is it about fictional
plots and characters, for example,
that enables Shadwell, Miller, and
Centlivre to expose the modest witness as an artificial, rhetorical construction? Chico hints that it has
to do with their power to resituate
experimental philosophy “within
the context of domestic and affective relations” (62)—that is, to make
visible again the worldly interests and associations that scientists
must conceal in order to make their
claims about nature seem objective and universal. But she does not
show us any eighteenth-century
sources articulating this point the
way she does, say, when illustrating
Boyle’s understanding of metaphor
or Fontenelle’s use of the seduction
plot, nor does she relate it to any of
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the recent work on the epistemology of fictionality by Catherine
Gallagher, Jesse Molesworth, or
Sarah Tindal Kareem.
Chico also argues here and elsewhere that literary knowledge is
shown to be “superior” (46) to science because it is able to go “beyond
the material” (134). But this hierarchical model of the relation between
literature and science implies a set
of idealist, even Kantian, epistemological assumptions that are never
theorized or made explicit. What
makes the knowledge of human
subjectivity and social interaction
that seems to be the special preserve
of fictional narratives—“moral”
knowledge, as it was called in the
period—superior to the knowledge
of physical nature derived from
experimental science? Is scientific
knowledge necessarily devalued by
the revelation that it is produced
by flawed human beings with
their own interests and agendas?
Shadwell may have thought so, but
did Centlivre? And is this a position we would want to endorse
today in an age of anti-vaxx movements and climate denialism?
Similar questions might be asked
about the final chapter, in which
Chico examines the emergence of
aesthetics out of and in response to
the natural sciences via readings of
Alexander Pope’s The Rape of the
Lock (1717) and James Thomson’s
The Seasons (1730). Does the power
of poetry to expose the limits of
mere perception and the dialectical
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relation between observed particulars and theorized generalizations
really diminish the value of scientific knowledge? Couldn’t we say,
less polemically, that literary texts
promote the kind of self-reflexivity about the social conditions
and limits of scientific knowledge
that feminist science studies scholars such as Sandra Harding and
Donna Haraway have in mind
when they argue for “strong objectivity?” In such a model, literature’s
relation to science would be critical,
certainly, but complementary and
collaborative rather than competitive or hierarchical. Indeed, this is
the model that Chico herself seems
to suggest when she notes the
unexpected affinities between the
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modest witness of natural philosophy and the “disinterested spectator” (140) theorized in the work of
early aesthetic philosophers such as
the Earl of Shaftesbury and Francis
Hutcheson. Nonetheless, in an era
of dwindling majors and vanishing jobs, literary studies needs its
boosters, and Chico’s book, even if
it sometimes overshoots, makes a
compelling case for the distinctive
quality and historical importance
of literature as a source of knowledge about the world.
Joseph Drury is Associate Professor of
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author of Novel Machines: Technology
and Narrative Form in Enlightenment
Britain (Oxford University Press, 2017).
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